Book Review: Master of War

Master of War: The life of General George H. Thomas – Benson Bobrick

If you are interested in GEN George Thomas you might enjoy this book.  If you hate GEN Grant, and GEN Sherman with a passion then you will absolutely love this book. 

Benson Bobrick quickly loses the story of GEN George Thomas and turns this into a straight attack on the careers of GEN Grant, and GEN Sherman.  I feel that his attacks on the accomplishments of the other two Generals takes away from the amazing story of George Thomas one of the Civil War’s great Generals. 

Growing up students frequently learn about the greatness of Grant, and Sherman’s March to the Sea, but it is not very frequently that we hear about the brilliance of MG George Thomas.  Thomas was a great leader during the Mexican-American War, the peacetime between, during the Civil War, and the reconstruction that followed.  One can only wonder where his career would have gone if he had not passed away shortly after the Civil War.  This book is great for learning some basic facts of Thomas’s life.  It is also very frustrating to read, as the author has a clear agenda, and uses very flawed logic and selective quotes to try and prove it.  Below are some of my problems with the book.

Only a hand full of pages into the book, the author takes the reader on a multi page description of the early life of Nat Turner, the slave who lead a very deadly rebellion in Virginia during the 1830’s.  Turner does play a role in Thomas’s life, as Thomas narrowly escaped death as a young child at the hand of Turner’s rampaging rebellion, but this is a book on Thomas, and not Turner so I’m not sure why the author went so into detail of Turner’s life that had no serious bearing on the story of Thomas. 

When we get to the Civil War portion of the book, there is only so much I could take before getting very frustrated with the author.   It starts with Shiloh.  Grant and Sherman deserve a ton of blame for how the Union army was pushed to the brink of defeat on the first day of this battle, no one can argue that.  The fact is that the Union held, and it was Grant’s plan of battle for the next morning that drove the Confederates back and saved the battle from being a total disaster.  While making a point about Union, and Confederate casualties the author uses a very round number to show the number of Union casualties, in 13,000, but then makes a claim that just isn’t true “though no one knows for sure what the Confederate losses were, they were apparently less”  Really??  No one knows what the Confederate losses were at Shiloh??  For one, the National Park Service uses 10,500 as their number, and I can find 12 other sources that place the number between 10K, and 11K.  That is just a line that did not need to be written, it seems petty, and sent off some red flags for what was to come in the book. 

The next part of the book that frustrated me was the description of GEN Rosecrans’ campaign to capture Chattanooga, TN.  Rosecrans used maneuver brilliantly to push the confederates back, and take the city, but the author goes a little too far.  He calls it one of the great campaigns in the history of warfare.  That may have been true, but then you have to look at the result of the campaign.   The enemy force that he was operating against allowed him to extend his supply lines, and pulled back without suffering major casualties.   This same force that he so “brilliantly” defeated by maneuver, then crushed his Army at Chickamauga, where only Thomas’s brilliant, and desperate stand saved the day.  From Chickamauga, Rosecrans, and his Army were put under siege at Chattanooga, surviving on only half rations for an extended period of time, and leading to the firing of Rosecrans, elevating Thomas to control of his force and Grant to commander of all forces in the area.  It would be one thing if the author acknowledge that Rosecrans’ campaign was flawed because his army got smashed by the force he allowed to escape, but he doesn’t do that.  He also reaches to disparage Grant’s Vicksburg campaign, a campaign that is actually viewed by many military historians as one of the great campaigns in Military History.  In that campaign, Grant opened the Mississippi River, and captured an entire Confederate Army that was in a position that many though would never fall.  Once again, it was the author losing focus on Thomas’s brilliance as a commander, and being more worried about attacking Grant. 

Another major issue I have with the Author is that he totally assaults Sherman for his March to Sea.  The March to the Sea was a very risky, and rewarding campaign for the Union Army.  Abraham Lincoln and many in the North viewed it as a near suicidal move, and feared that Sherman would get cut off.  It is funny that the Author even gives some credit to the march later in the book by accident when he references that the confederate cavalry was riding worn out, and substandard mounts as they went against Thomas, and Schofield in Tennessee.  He does not draw the connection, but almost any reader can to his earlier line where he mentions that Sherman’s men had too many fine horses to ride by the time they reached the coast.  That was one of the biggest points of the March to the Sea, get into the Agricultural, and spiritual heartland of the confederacy and let the people there know that they were losing the war.  Every ounce of supplies that Sherman’s army picked up along the way, was a ounce of supply denied to Confederate forces.  These supplies include the horses used by the Confederate cavalry.  There are also many reports that moral decreased, and desertions among Georgia, and South Carolina units increased as the Soldiers in Lee’s Army found out that their homes were being threatened and left undefended by this march.  Was the March to the Sea perfect?  No, Sherman clearly could have left more veteran troops with Thomas to secure Tennessee, and Northern Alabama.  But the key is that he did leave Thomas there with more independence then he had for the entire war, and it paid off. 

My last major issue with the Author is over the inflated competence of Confederate General John Bell Hood, the quality of his Army in December 1864, and the circumstances surrounding Grant and Thomas’s relationship leading up to the Battle of Nashville.  Hood took command of the Confederate Army in the deep South as Sherman closed in on Atlanta, and promptly lost over 14,000 Soldiers, and Atlanta.  Georgia became un-defendable, and he retreated to Alabama with no force capable of opposing Sherman as he marched through the deep south.  After receiving some re-enforcements Hood decided to move on Nashville, and potentially Kentucky, and points north.  Hood did not win many battles in his Civil War career, when he was matched against Thomas many called it “The General who never wins against the General who never loses.”  If you were to just read the accounts of this book though you would think that Hood was every bit the equal of Jackson, and Lee. 

On his way to Nashville, the Confederate Army under Hood ran into a Union force commanded by MG Schofield at Franklin, TN approximately 20 miles South of Nashville.  To understand this completely you have to realize that Thomas was in Nashville organizing the defenses of the second most fortified city in the Civil War.  Hood jumped at the opportunity to destroy a large portion of Thomas’s force at Franklin before they could get back to Nashville and under the protection of the fortifications.  What happened was that the Confederate Army that had already taken massive losses only 4 months earlier while losing Atlanta, sustained over 6,000 Casualties while being thrown against hasty Union earthworks that held the day for Schofield’s force.   To make matters worse for the Confederates 14 Generals, and 55 regimental commanders were among the Casualties that day.   Many of the Casualties and Commanders lost came from Hood’s best remaining units.  It is amazing that the Author does not give much weight to the events at Franklin, and emphasizes that Schofield then retreated back to Nashville.  It is a clear distortion of the importance of this battle, for the only reason that Thomas was not on the ground, and to admit the facts would make it harder to give praise to Thomas for the next phase of the story.

Following Franklin Hood followed Schofield to the outskirts of Nashville, where he set up and dug in about 2 miles outside of the Union defensive positions.  Hood was in charge of an Army that had just suffered one of the largest drains in leadership in the History of warfare.  It was a battered force, with extended supply lines, facing very harsh weather conditions.   Hood’s entire career had been marked by attack after attack, and an aggressive nature, but now all of a sudden outside of Nashville he stopped and waited.  The author does not recognize that the sudden change in Hood’s character is as much because his Army was in no shape to fight, as anything else.  The goal was Nashville, but Hood could not take a battered leaderless Army into Nashville against Thomas’s forces.  To read the author’s account you might believe that this was still the same force in capability, leadership, and moral that Hood took over at Atlanta, and that is just not true. 

Another incident comes up during the story of Nashville where the author gives the reader this right answer but hides it behind his rhetoric.  The author goes into detail about how Grant from his base in City Point, VA wanted Thomas to attack Hood as soon as possible.  Thomas insisted that his cavalry, and the weather conditions were not ready for attack, and he needed some more time.  Grant got to the point where he was ready to board a train to go relieve Thomas, before being stopped.  This is supposed to in the author’s mind show how incompetent, and spiteful towards Thomas that Grant was.  The reality was that for every telegram that Grant received from Thomas explaining the delays, he was also receiving one from Thomas’s second in command Schofield telling him that the Army, and conditions were ready for attack, but Thomas was timid, and gun shy.  The reality is that the truth lies more with Thomas’s version that Schofield’s, and the subsequent battle proves that out.  But Grant was dependent on the finest in 1864 communications.  There is no telephone where Grant can get Thomas on the line for a Battle update brief, everything is by telegraph across nearly a thousand miles.  Grant as commander of all Union forces has preached an aggressive mentality since his first day on the job, and now he is receiving word from one General that the Army in ready to fight, while the Commander seems to be dragging his feet.  I totally understand why Grant would want to fire Thomas right there, he had seen the casualty numbers for the Confederates at Atlanta, and Franklin and knew that Hood was in charge of a battered force that he did not want to give time to recover.   Grant did not relieve Thomas, and the rest is history.  Thomas executed a brilliant tactical plan, and smashed Hood’s Army just outside of Nashville in mid December 1864.  Nashville was not threatened again for the remainder of the war, and Hoods forces no longer posed a serious threat to the West. 

To sum up my feelings on this book again, I think Thomas was an amazing General.  He is easily in the top 5 Civil War generals from both sides, and an argument could be made for number 2.  I just feel that this book got off point of how great Thomas was, and spent too much time trying to downplay Grant and Sherman.  I do not understand the logic here, to show how great Thomas is, all you have to do is study the man, and show his record, there is no reason to attack Grant and Sherman. 

My overall review is that this book gets the rank of Major General  (2 out of 5 star)