Master of War: The life of General George H. Thomas – Benson
Bobrick
If you are interested in GEN George Thomas you might enjoy
this book. If you hate GEN Grant, and
GEN Sherman with a passion then you will absolutely love this book.
Benson Bobrick quickly loses the story of GEN George Thomas
and turns this into a straight attack on the careers of GEN Grant, and GEN
Sherman. I feel that his attacks on the
accomplishments of the other two Generals takes away from the amazing story of
George Thomas one of the Civil War’s great Generals.
Growing up students frequently learn about the greatness of
Grant, and Sherman’s March to the Sea, but it is not very frequently that we
hear about the brilliance of MG George Thomas.
Thomas was a great leader during the Mexican-American War, the peacetime
between, during the Civil War, and the reconstruction that followed. One can only wonder where his career would
have gone if he had not passed away shortly after the Civil War. This book is great for learning some basic
facts of Thomas’s life. It is also very
frustrating to read, as the author has a clear agenda, and uses very flawed
logic and selective quotes to try and prove it.
Below are some of my problems with the book.
Only a hand full of pages into the book, the author takes
the reader on a multi page description of the early life of Nat Turner, the
slave who lead a very deadly rebellion in Virginia during the 1830’s. Turner does play a role in Thomas’s life, as
Thomas narrowly escaped death as a young child at the hand of Turner’s
rampaging rebellion, but this is a book on Thomas, and not Turner so I’m not
sure why the author went so into detail of Turner’s life that had no serious
bearing on the story of Thomas.
When we get to the Civil War portion of the book, there is
only so much I could take before getting very frustrated with the author. It starts with Shiloh. Grant and Sherman deserve a ton of blame for
how the Union army was pushed to the brink of defeat on the first day of this
battle, no one can argue that. The fact
is that the Union held, and it was Grant’s plan of battle for the next morning
that drove the Confederates back and saved the battle from being a total
disaster. While making a point about
Union, and Confederate casualties the author uses a very round number to show
the number of Union casualties, in 13,000, but then makes a claim that just
isn’t true “though no one knows for sure what the Confederate losses were, they
were apparently less” Really?? No one knows what the Confederate losses were
at Shiloh?? For one, the National Park
Service uses 10,500 as their number, and I can find 12 other sources that place
the number between 10K, and 11K. That is
just a line that did not need to be written, it seems petty, and sent off some
red flags for what was to come in the book.
The next part of the book that frustrated me was the
description of GEN Rosecrans’ campaign to capture Chattanooga, TN. Rosecrans used maneuver brilliantly to push
the confederates back, and take the city, but the author goes a little too
far. He calls it one of the great
campaigns in the history of warfare.
That may have been true, but then you have to look at the result of the
campaign. The enemy force that he was
operating against allowed him to extend his supply lines, and pulled back
without suffering major casualties.
This same force that he so “brilliantly” defeated by maneuver, then
crushed his Army at Chickamauga, where only Thomas’s brilliant, and desperate stand
saved the day. From Chickamauga,
Rosecrans, and his Army were put under siege at Chattanooga, surviving on only
half rations for an extended period of time, and leading to the firing of
Rosecrans, elevating Thomas to control of his force and Grant to commander of
all forces in the area. It would be one
thing if the author acknowledge that Rosecrans’ campaign was flawed because his
army got smashed by the force he allowed to escape, but he doesn’t do
that. He also reaches to disparage
Grant’s Vicksburg campaign, a campaign that is actually viewed by many military
historians as one of the great campaigns in Military History. In that campaign, Grant opened the
Mississippi River, and captured an entire Confederate Army that was in a
position that many though would never fall.
Once again, it was the author losing focus on Thomas’s brilliance as a
commander, and being more worried about attacking Grant.
Another major issue I have with the Author is that he
totally assaults Sherman for his March to Sea.
The March to the Sea was a very risky, and rewarding campaign for the
Union Army. Abraham Lincoln and many in
the North viewed it as a near suicidal move, and feared that Sherman would get
cut off. It is funny that the Author
even gives some credit to the march later in the book by accident when he
references that the confederate cavalry was riding worn out, and substandard
mounts as they went against Thomas, and Schofield in Tennessee. He does not draw the connection, but almost
any reader can to his earlier line where he mentions that Sherman’s men had too
many fine horses to ride by the time they reached the coast. That was one of the biggest points of the
March to the Sea, get into the Agricultural, and spiritual heartland of the
confederacy and let the people there know that they were losing the war. Every ounce of supplies that Sherman’s army
picked up along the way, was a ounce of supply denied to Confederate
forces. These supplies include the
horses used by the Confederate cavalry. There
are also many reports that moral decreased, and desertions among Georgia, and
South Carolina units increased as the Soldiers in Lee’s Army found out that
their homes were being threatened and left undefended by this march. Was the March to the Sea perfect? No, Sherman clearly could have left more
veteran troops with Thomas to secure Tennessee, and Northern Alabama. But the key is that he did leave Thomas there
with more independence then he had for the entire war, and it paid off.
My last major issue with the Author is over the inflated competence
of Confederate General John Bell Hood, the quality of his Army in December
1864, and the circumstances surrounding Grant and Thomas’s relationship leading
up to the Battle of Nashville. Hood took
command of the Confederate Army in the deep South as Sherman closed in on
Atlanta, and promptly lost over 14,000 Soldiers, and Atlanta. Georgia became un-defendable, and he
retreated to Alabama with no force capable of opposing Sherman as he marched
through the deep south. After receiving
some re-enforcements Hood decided to move on Nashville, and potentially
Kentucky, and points north. Hood did not
win many battles in his Civil War career, when he was matched against Thomas
many called it “The General who never wins against the General who never loses.” If you were to just read the accounts of this
book though you would think that Hood was every bit the equal of Jackson, and
Lee.
On his way to Nashville, the
Confederate Army under Hood ran into a Union force commanded by MG Schofield at
Franklin, TN approximately 20 miles South of Nashville. To understand this completely you have to
realize that Thomas was in Nashville organizing the defenses of the second most
fortified city in the Civil War. Hood
jumped at the opportunity to destroy a large portion of Thomas’s force at
Franklin before they could get back to Nashville and under the protection of
the fortifications. What happened was
that the Confederate Army that had already taken massive losses only 4 months
earlier while losing Atlanta, sustained over 6,000 Casualties while being
thrown against hasty Union earthworks that held the day for Schofield’s
force. To make matters worse for the
Confederates 14 Generals, and 55 regimental commanders were among the
Casualties that day. Many of the Casualties
and Commanders lost came from Hood’s best remaining units. It is amazing that the Author does not give
much weight to the events at Franklin, and emphasizes that Schofield then
retreated back to Nashville. It is a
clear distortion of the importance of this battle, for the only reason that
Thomas was not on the ground, and to admit the facts would make it harder to
give praise to Thomas for the next phase of the story.
Following Franklin Hood followed
Schofield to the outskirts of Nashville, where he set up and dug in about 2
miles outside of the Union defensive positions.
Hood was in charge of an Army that had just suffered one of the largest
drains in leadership in the History of warfare.
It was a battered force, with extended supply lines, facing very harsh
weather conditions. Hood’s entire
career had been marked by attack after attack, and an aggressive nature, but
now all of a sudden outside of Nashville he stopped and waited. The author does not recognize that the sudden
change in Hood’s character is as much because his Army was in no shape to
fight, as anything else. The goal was
Nashville, but Hood could not take a battered leaderless Army into Nashville
against Thomas’s forces. To read the
author’s account you might believe that this was still the same force in
capability, leadership, and moral that Hood took over at Atlanta, and that is
just not true.
Another incident comes up during
the story of Nashville where the author gives the reader this right answer but
hides it behind his rhetoric. The author
goes into detail about how Grant from his base in City Point, VA wanted Thomas
to attack Hood as soon as possible. Thomas
insisted that his cavalry, and the weather conditions were not ready for attack,
and he needed some more time. Grant got
to the point where he was ready to board a train to go relieve Thomas, before
being stopped. This is supposed to in
the author’s mind show how incompetent, and spiteful towards Thomas that Grant
was. The reality was that for every
telegram that Grant received from Thomas explaining the delays, he was also
receiving one from Thomas’s second in command Schofield telling him that the
Army, and conditions were ready for attack, but Thomas was timid, and gun shy. The reality is that the truth lies more with
Thomas’s version that Schofield’s, and the subsequent battle proves that
out. But Grant was dependent on the
finest in 1864 communications. There is
no telephone where Grant can get Thomas on the line for a Battle update brief,
everything is by telegraph across nearly a thousand miles. Grant as commander of all Union forces has
preached an aggressive mentality since his first day on the job, and now he is
receiving word from one General that the Army in ready to fight, while the
Commander seems to be dragging his feet.
I totally understand why Grant would want to fire Thomas right there, he
had seen the casualty numbers for the Confederates at Atlanta, and Franklin and
knew that Hood was in charge of a battered force that he did not want to give
time to recover. Grant did not relieve
Thomas, and the rest is history. Thomas
executed a brilliant tactical plan, and smashed Hood’s Army just outside of
Nashville in mid December 1864.
Nashville was not threatened again for the remainder of the war, and
Hoods forces no longer posed a serious threat to the West.
To sum up my feelings on this book
again, I think Thomas was an amazing General.
He is easily in the top 5 Civil War generals from both sides, and an
argument could be made for number 2. I
just feel that this book got off point of how great Thomas was, and spent too
much time trying to downplay Grant and Sherman.
I do not understand the logic here, to show how great Thomas is, all you
have to do is study the man, and show his record, there is no reason to attack
Grant and Sherman.
My
overall review is that this book gets the rank of Major General (2 out of 5 star)
